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THE JERUSALEM BASIC LAW (1980) AND THE JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT 
(1995): A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF ISRAELI AND US LEGISLATION 
ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM 
 
Michael Zank 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This essay, written from a religious studies perspective, compares two pieces of largely 
symbolic legislation, the Israeli 1980 Jerusalem Basic Law and the US 1995 Jerusalem 
Embassy Act, situating them in their respective historical contexts and raising questions 
about the dynamic of legislative acts that exceed the intention of both those who introduced 
these bills and the legislators who passed them into law. I argue that these laws indicate the 
power of broadly-shared public sentiments in modern politics and policy-making, a power 
that has the potential of overwhelming more pragmatic and cautious approaches to public 
law. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The article explores two pieces of legislation on the status of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, 
namely, the Israeli Basic Law on Jerusalem passed in 1980 and amended in 2000, and the US 
Congress Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995. 
The questions with which I approach these texts are those of a scholar of religion.1 
These laws interest me precisely because they are of a largely symbolic nature that sheds light 
on the value of symbols in modern law, policy, and politics. In my view, they attest to the 
persistence of religious symbols and their permutations in modern, ostensibly secular, 
politics. 
My overall impression is threefold: 1) Both pieces of legislation are of a symbolic 
nature—they are political declarations in the form of law. 2) As statements expressing a 
widely shared consensus, they convert a kind of oral tradition into written law. 3) By adding 
the force of written law to a previously held, widely shared assumption, they create a 
normative, prescriptive momentum that goes beyond the wording of the declaration itself. 
Thus, the act of converting a widely shared consensus into a written law, even a “basic law” 
11	March	2016	
2 
of constitutional status, binds the community that shared the prior consensus to a greater 
degree than the prior consensus.2 Writing a broadly held assumption into law thus binds and 
obliges the political community in significant ways. It changes the status quo even where it 
merely affirms it in writing, and it signals a watershed moment of “confession” that may be 
compared to a kind of collective conversion experience. In both cases, but especially in the 
case of the Jerusalem Basic Law, its introduction and passage into law is tied to the fear of a 
significant erosion of the prior consensus and hence acts as a call to a renewed commitment 
to values and assumptions in which a significant sector of society seemed to lose interest or 
in regard to which—when pressed—the public began to change its mind. The “Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel” was largely meant for internal consumption where it aimed to 
strengthen unity and resolve. As anticipated by some of the lawmakers, the response of the 
international community to the law was swift and overwhelmingly critical. It is characteristic 
of its moment in history that the legislature, which passed the law nearly unanimously, was 
fully aware of these potentially grave foreign policy consequences but nevertheless felt 
compelled to stand behind it, making this an interesting object of study also from the 
perspective of political psychology. 
The Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 states that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the 
capital of Israel.” The US Congress Jerusalem Embassy Act, passed 15 years later, mandates 
the US Department of State to move the US embassy to Jerusalem and declares that “(1) 
Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic and religious 
group are protected;” and “(2) Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State of 
Israel.”3 
What is at stake in both of these legislative acts is the legal status of Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel and its “unity”, indicating that these laws (as well as their antecedents and/or 
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amendments) were passed—though by different legislative bodies—with a view to 
impending threats of a redivision of Jerusalem that loomed large at certain moments when 
the future of the city was seriously considered in the context of bilateral negotiations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors brokered by the US directly or as part of an 
international coalition. The first time this threat was looming was during the US-brokered 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy. The second time this threat 
was looming was during what, according to the ambitious agenda then on the table, were 
supposed to be comprehensive final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
National Authority held at Camp David in 2000. Both rounds of negotiation ended without 
breakthrough agreements and both were hampered in part by the Jerusalem question, which 
continues to remain unresolved.4 
In both cases, the Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 and the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy 
Act, we are dealing with political declarations in the form of a law. Both were passed by a 
significant majority of votes, despite all misgivings lawmakers expressed during the 
antecedent debates.5 Both laws expressed views and opinions that were widely shared among 
the senators, representatives, and members of Knesset and the people they represented, and 
perhaps even by some who voted against these laws. And yet both laws were highly 
controversial because of their timing and because of political and legal implications of 
putting in writing what had been previously agreed on as a matter of course.6 
The Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 caused international consternation and 
condemnation of Israel’s actions in regard to Arab East-Jerusalem, the part of the city 
conquered in June 1967 and since integrated into an expanded municipality and in effect 
annexed by the State of Israel. Perceived as a provocation and an affront against 
international law and the will of the international community, as expressed in UN Resolution 
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242 (1967) and later resolutions,7 and specifically as a poke-in-the-eye of Israel’s partners in 
peace, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and US President Jimmy Carter, the Basic Law 
imperiled the peace treaty with Egypt concluded in 1979 and negatively impacted the 
ongoing negotiations between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank 
and Gaza. UN Security Council Resolution 478 explicitly censored Israel for adopting the 
Jerusalem Basic Law and what it regarded as Israel’s non-compliance with prior Security 
Council resolutions, prompting the thirteen countries who, after 1967, had continued to 
maintain their embassies in Jerusalem, to withdraw them in 1980. 
THE JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT OF 1995 
The Jerusalem Embassy Act, introduced by then-Senators Bob Dole and Jon Kyl (originally 
known as the Dole-Kyl-Bill),8 accentuated the tension between conservative members of 
Congress and the pro-Israel lobby on the one hand and the Clinton Administration on the 
other hand, similar to tensions that had arisen between Congress and the first President 
Bush’s administration that had led to the non-binding antecedent of the Embassy Act, 
introduced in 1990.9 This tension between US Congress and the Administration is ongoing.10 
To people who are unaware of the debates on the legal status of Jerusalem in 
international law, and especially to Americans who take it for granted that Jerusalem is the 
capital of Israel, the Jerusalem Embassy Act offers the surprising insight that the United 
States of America does not officially, unambiguously, or uniformly recognize the city of 
Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel. This law, and the wrangling between two of the 
three constitutional powers that it represents, is also an excellent exercise in American 
politics. The official position of the US Government on the status of Jerusalem—the city 
Israel, one of its staunchest allies, regards as its capital—is that it is subject to final status 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and that, until these are reached, Jerusalem’s 
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status continues to be ruled de jure by the 1947 UN Partition Resolution, which designated 
the municipality as part of a larger corpus separatum under an international regime. It is not 
entirely clear, however, why despite the Embassy Act of 1995 no administration, Democrat 
and Republican alike, has felt compelled to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, as the US 
does indeed recognize West-Jerusalem as the de facto capital of Israel. 
To specialists who are fully aware of the debates on the legal status of Jerusalem in 
international law, something else is noteworthy about the Jerusalem Embassy Act, namely, 
the fact that it fails to make reference to the 1980 Israeli “Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital 
of Israel”. Instead, the Jerusalem Embassy Act invokes certain facts on the ground as 
“findings” in order to justify the stipulation that the US should officially recognize Jerusalem 
as the capital of Israel. These facts on the ground are an interesting and complex list made 
up of historical facts, prior US policy statements on Jerusalem, and a few more general 
comments that indicate a widely shared American consensus regarding the status and 
character of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. 
Two types of findings are particularly noteworthy, namely arguments on what is 
“normal” in international relations, and arguments pertaining to the particular situation of 
Jerusalem. Arguments of the first kind are that countries are free to choose their capital cities 
and that the US, like any other country, usually locate their embassy in the city that the host 
country chooses as the seat of its government. Arguments of the second kind include a 
reference to the fact that Jerusalem has served as Israel’s capital since 1950, a mention of 
Jerusalem’s spiritual value to Judaism, and the claim that it is only since 1967, i.e., with the 
beginning of Israeli rule over the Old City and its holy places, that religious freedom has 
been maintained, in contrast to restrictions on access to holy places that obtained in the 
years of Jordanian rule over East Jerusalem. 
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The list foregrounds Jewish spiritual attachments to the holy city, going beyond the 
rationale included in the findings of H. Con. Res. 290 (1990), the non-binding resolution that 
set the legislative precedent for the Embassy Act. This resolution, passed at the time of the 
Madrid Conference, when the Bush Administration openly referred to the neighborhoods 
Israel had built in East Jerusalem since 1967 as “settlements”, emphasized freedom of access 
to the holy places, stating that until 1967 “Israeli citizens of all faiths were not permitted 
access to holy sites in the area controlled by Jordan.”11 Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 
(1990) simply affirmed “that Jerusalem must remain an undivided city in which the rights of 
every ethnic religious group are protected”, without naming any specific “ethnic religious” as 
particularly threatened, nor specified the kinds of rights in question. 
None of the facts listed as “findings” in section 2 of the 1995 Embassy Act have the 
force of law, and the one law that could have been invoked, the Jerusalem Basic Law of 
1980, is not mentioned. The Embassy Act obliquely refers to acts of the Israeli Knesset 
proclaimed in late 1949 and early 1950 that laid claim to “Jerusalem, the eternal” as Israel’s 
capital, but it does not invoke any specific Israeli legislation in order to determine why 
Jerusalem should be officially recognized by the US as the capital of Israel without waiting 
for the outcome of final status negotiations, as has been the official US position since 1967, 
and really since 1948. Instead, the US Congress draws on various types of opinions, 
perceptions, and precedents to put pressure on the Administration to change its long-
standing policy in regard to limiting its diplomatic representation in Jerusalem. 
The Embassy Act leaves many questions open and unaddressed. It does not address 
what territory it refers to when it says of Jerusalem that it “should remain an undivided city”; 
it does not specify the ethnic and religious groups that constitute the populations of 
Jerusalem and it does not explain who will be in charge of the protection of their rights. The 
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clause that stipulates the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital does not rule out the 
possibility that Jerusalem could also serve as the capital of a Palestinian state. The fact that 
the Embassy Act refers back to Jerusalem’s status as Israel’s capital as a fact prevailing since 
1950 implies the possibility that, in the future, West Jerusalem could continue to serve as 
Israel’s capital, while East Jerusalem could host the institutions of a sovereign Palestinian 
state. That the city should remain undivided was also stipulated, though limited to a 
municipal and functional unity, in one of the letters written by Anwar al-Sadat following the 
conclusion of the Camp David Agreement of 1978. Thus, the Jerusalem Embassy Act does 
not explicitly mandate the US Government to take a stand on the future of Jerusalem, as 
determined by final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. 
However, the message this law sent to the Clinton Administration and that Congress 
has repeatedly affirmed ever since, is strong and clear in its intention, an intention that 
differs from that expressed in the 1990 antecedent resolutions of the 101st Congress, and 
hence indicates a shift in emphasis from the rhetoric of freedom for all religions to the 
particular consideration of Jewish rights and sentiments. This, I believe, is the significance of 
the emphasis, in the 1995 Act’s findings, on Jerusalem’s character as “the spiritual center of 
Judaism”, as well as the fact that it considers the attachment of “the members of other 
religious faiths” to the holy city as secondary to that of the Jews. In this regard, US 
legislation concerning Jerusalem, now more than in the past, echoes the language of the 1917 
Balfour Declaration which, without mentioning Jerusalem, spoke of His Majesty’s support 
for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, whereby “Nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” 
This bifurcation between Jewish rights on the one hand and “the civil and religious rights” 
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of “non-Jewish communities” was not part of the language of the 1990 resolution on 
Jerusalem, but it is has been written into US law since 1995. 
To be sure, Congress left a safety valve in place and provided the Presidency with the 
option of signing a waiver, invoking unspecified national security reasons. This waiver has 
been diligently produced by every sitting US President every six months, as required by the 
Embassy Act, which is the reason the US embassy is still located in Tel-Aviv. 
THE 1980 ISRAELI BASIC LAW INTRODUCED BY MK GEULAH COHEN 
The 1980 Israeli Basic Law: “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel” is vague, short on detail, and 
redundant in its specifics, all of which were the subject of prior Israeli legislation. It did not 
change, or mandate any change, but merely affirmed Jerusalem’s status quo as Israel’s capital. 
Though it underscores and writes into law the intention for Jerusalem to be “complete and 
united”, the Jerusalem Basic Law does not define the territorial boundaries of Jerusalem, nor 
does it define its major terms (“complete”, “united”). The major provisions of the law 
reiterate other Basic Laws with regard to Jerusalem serving as the seat of the government 
and its major institutions and repeat stipulations of a 1967 ordinance regarding the 
protection of holy places. 
To understand this law better, it helps to compare it with the bill on which it was 
based. The “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel” that was passed after several readings 
deviates in interesting ways from the draft bill that MK Geulah Cohen had introduced for 
consideration on 14 May 1980, as a member of the opposition Tehiyah party, which 
represented the interests of the Gush Emunim settler movement. 
The original bill reads as follows:12 
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel 
1. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. 
The Completeness of Jerusalem 
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2. The completeness and the unity of Greater Jerusalem, in the boundaries since after the 
Six Day War are inviolable. 
Residence of the President, the Knesset, the Government, and the Supreme Court 
3. The President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court – their 
permanent place of residence is Jerusalem. 
 
This draft bill was discussed several times, both in the plenary and in committee. The 
discussions in the Knesset that preceded the passage of the “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of 
Israel” indicate that Jerusalem’s status as the capital of Israel was not in question. No one 
suggested that Jerusalem should not be considered Israel’s capital or that its status was up 
for debate. The elevated status in Judaism—explicitly mentioned neither in the bill nor in the 
Basic Law passed later on, but surfacing in the 1995 US Embassy Act—was mentioned 
during the debates, where it was referred to (by MK Yosef Burg) as obvious and taken for 
granted. The intersection between generally shared religious sentiments and political 
considerations that was evident in the comments made by lawmakers never surfaces in the 
law itself. But the basic assertion of the law was thus uncontroversial. It expressed a broad 
consensus on the status of Jerusalem for Jews and for the State of Israel as a Jewish state 
that had indeed prevailed officially since late 1949/early 1950 and unofficially all along, as 
the very name “Zionism” contains a reference to biblical Jerusalem. 
However, many of those who participated in the lively debates at the time found the 
law needless and redundant, as well as its timing unfortunate and its impact potentially 
damaging to Israel’s reputation and to the ongoing peace process. The final version, which 
was overwhelmingly voted into law even by those who would have preferred for there not to 
be such a law at all, is in some respects less explicit than the original draft and therefore fails 
to write into law the more far-reaching political assertion that led to its introduction. The 
annexation of East- to West-Jerusalem and the post-1967 borders of the city are no longer 
explicitly mentioned. In other respects the Basic Law is more explicit, such as when it 
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reiterates Israel’s commitment to the protection of the holy places (though without 
specifics). It thus neither wrote the status quo into law, as MK Geulah Cohen had intended, 
nor put in terms of a law the Jewish historical and religious sentiments on which the 
lawmakers agreed but left unspoken, and hence it left the final status of Jerusalem open and 
unresolved, except in the vaguest of terms. 
THE “BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM, CAPITAL OF ISRAEL” IN DETAIL 
The Jerusalem Basic Law passed in July 1980 consists of four paragraphs, to which an 
amendment, passed in 2000, added two further clauses and a stipulation. 
Paragraph 1 states that “Jerusalem, complete (המלשה) and united (תדחואמהו), is the capital of 
Israel.” 
The intent of the law is clear, even though it is not clearly stated: in the opinion of 
the lawmakers, Jerusalem had been legally reunited in 1967 and it is this reunited city that is 
meant to be preserved. At the same time, the law fails to specify what it means by the 
“complete” city of Jerusalem, which municipal boundaries are to be used as a point of 
reference, and how to account for possible revisions of these boundaries, such as the 
westward municipal expansion of 1993. There are also many misgivings about the extent to 
which Jerusalem has been “united”, as it is obvious that in many respects Israel failed to 
integrate the Arab population of Jerusalem into the fabric of Israeli society or even into the 
municipality of the city.13 
It is difficult to avoid the impression that the intention of the Israeli government in 
1967, in 1980, and ever since was not to integrate the Arab population of East Jerusalem 
into Israeli society, but rather to assert sovereignty over East Jerusalem, specifically over the 
Jewish Quarter of the Old City, over the Jewish cemetery on Mount Olives, and the historic 
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City of David, underneath the village of Silwan, as well as over other places of particular 
Jewish historical or religious concern. 
The lack of concern with the integration of East Jerusalem’s non-Jewish population 
into the fabric of Israeli society is evident from the many exceptions and special 
arrangements made for the Arabs of East Jerusalem since 1967. Among these many respects 
in which Israel has made exceptions and effectively forestalled unification is the school 
system, where the Jordanian and later the Palestinian school books and exams prevailed and 
the Israeli curriculum was never introduced; the extension of residency but not citizenship to 
the Arabs of East Jerusalem, leaving them exposed to the possibility of losing their residency 
status due to extended absences; the use of Jordanian currency; the lack of proper 
registration of properties, housing development, infrastructure, and other services; and other 
vital measures of unification of the constituent communities of the city. In this regard the 
law does not state a fact, and the sense or degree to which it establishes a goal for future 
development is unclear. 
Paragraph 2 states facts in the form of a basic law that had been in place since late 
1950, as also noted in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, and notionally dated from the 
very inception of the State of Israel, though their implementation had initially been delayed 
by reasons of war, namely, that “Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the 
Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court.” 
Paragraph 2 in no way impacts on the status quo of Jerusalem, and one may wonder, 
as some who debated the law did, whether writing something into law that had hitherto been 
taken for granted does not call into the question the legitimacy of the status quo ante. 
Furthermore, the stipulations made in this paragraph had been the subject of prior “basic 
laws” concerning the seat of the presidency, the Knesset, the Government, and Supreme 
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Court, rendering the paragraph redundant from a legal perspective. It is possible that the 
lawmakers felt the need to preserve some of the language introduced by MK Geulah Cohen 
as they deprived her bill of other, more aggressive stipulations. 
Paragraph 3 speaks to the protection of the Holy Places. “The Holy Places shall be 
protected from desecration (לולח) and any other violation and from anything likely to violate 
the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them 
or their feelings towards those places.” 
Obviously this is one of the more complicated statements of the law.14 There is no 
generally agreed list of places holy to the major communities of Jerusalem, though there are 
lists that are used as a reference. One of these lists dates from the time of the Mandate 
(1924), another one, which harks back to the first, was compiled in connection with the 
Israeli law for the protection of holy places of 1967. Neither of these lists refers to the 
Temple Mount as a Jewish holy place, whereas the 1924 British declaration mentions the 
Western Wall as a place holy to Jews, as well as to Muslims, though they refer to it as Al 
Buraq. 
The possibilities of conflict arising from the ambiguities in these vague formulations 
of holy places and their protection are endless. For example, does “freedom of access” also 
entail freedom of worship? How does this work when the same place is sacred to the 
members of more than one religion or to the members of different sects within one of the 
religions? The latter problem, namely, regulating the rights of different Christian sects in the 
Holy Sepulcher, was the task of the original “status quo” decree of the Ottomans, issued in a 
Firman of 1852 and written into the international peace treaty of 1856, following the 
Crimean War. When we speak of the “status quo” in the holy places, this is really the only 
one that has ever been written into law. In regard to every other place, including the Western 
11	March	2016	
13 
Wall/Al Buraq, the Temple Mount, and many lesser known places, it remains unclear what 
constitutes desecration and to whom. The fact that “feelings” are mentioned as well makes 
the matter even more complicated and volatile. Who is to protect the feelings, the rights of 
access, and the freedom of worship and where exactly—all of these things are left open and 
hence provide infinite possibilities for conflict. 
In recent years, it has been the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif that has become the 
flashpoint where Jewish freedom of access, Jewish freedom of worship, and Jewish religious 
rights and sentiments have become a test case for the protection of religious freedom in 
Jerusalem.15 It is here more than anywhere else that Jewish and Muslim claims are in 
immediate conflict and the Israeli government finds itself in a position to mediate between 
traditional religious rules and sentiments, neo-fundamentalist claims, and modernist 
conceptions of religious freedom and equal rights. It is illuminating that the conflict over 
Jewish access to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif has become fully virulent since the 
possibility arose, during Camp David II, that Israel might yield sovereignty over the Temple 
Mount to the Palestinian Authority. Jewish access to this sensitive site is today advocated 
mostly by religious settler communities and the parties that represent them for reasons in 
which religious sentiments and convictions are intermingled with the neo-Zionist desire for a 
decisive change in the status quo at one particular holy place, the Temple Mount, which is 
overly charged with messianic expectations.16 Read in this light and realizing that the 
presence of Muslim holy places in the most sacred place of Judaism may well violate the 
religious sentiments of many of the most devout Jews, the Jerusalem Basic Law has become 
a potential mandate not for the preservation and protection of the status quo but for its 
ultimate, messianic rectification. 
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Paragraph 4 a) mandates the Government to “provide for the development and 
prosperity of Jerusalem and the well-being of its inhabitants by allocating special funds, 
including a special annual grant to the Municipality of Jerusalem (Capital City Grant) with 
the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset.” 
Paragraph 4 b) prioritizes Jerusalem “in the activities of the authorities of the State 
so as to further its development in economic and other matters.” 
Paragraph 4 c) mandates the Government to “set up a special body or special bodies 
for the implementation of this section.” 
The vagueness of the definition of territory when speaking of Jerusalem “complete 
and united”, gave occasion—at a time when the redivision of the city was on the table during 
the Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in 2000, brokered by 
then-US President Bill Clinton—to add two provisions to the law as parts of Amendment 1, 
passed by the Knesset on 27 November 2000, two days before the anniversary of the UN 
Partition Vote of 1947. The two provisions are: 
Paragraph 5 “The jurisdiction of Jerusalem includes, as pertaining to this basic law, 
among others, all of the area that is described in the appendix of the proclamation expanding 
the borders of municipal Jerusalem beginning the 20th of Sivan 5727 (28 June 1967), as was 
given according to the Cities’ Ordinance.” This clause disambiguates to some extent the 
definition of Jerusalem as “complete and united” that the original version of the Basic Law 
had left somewhat ambiguous. 
Paragraph 6, finally, makes the territory of Jerusalem within the municipal 
boundaries determined since 28 June 1967, inalienable: “No authority that is stipulated in the 
law of the State of Israel or of the Jerusalem Municipality may be transferred either 
11	March	2016	
15 
permanently or for an allotted period of time to a foreign body, whether political, 
governmental or to any other similar type of foreign body.” 
Clearly this stipulation, which echoes language that had been first introduced by MK 
Geulah Cohen but omitted from the 1980 version of the law, means to forestall as 
unconstitutional any compromise on the sharing of sovereignty within the expanded 
boundaries of Jerusalem with a future Palestinian state, as discussed at the failed Camp 
David negotiations and envisaged by subsequent peace proposals, such as that proposed by 
the Geneva Initiative.17 
Finally, Paragraph 7 stipulates that the clauses added by the Amendment “shall not 
be modified except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.” 
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
The pieces of legislation I have briefly discussed here, issued at different times and by 
different legislatures, are largely of a symbolic nature in the sense that they did not introduce 
new subjects into the law of their respective countries but merely stated facts that were 
already widely assumed to be the case, or—as in the Embassy Law—required the US 
Government to act on what was widely assumed to be the case. The change required by the 
latter, i.e., the moving of the US Embassy from its current location in Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, 
was also of a largely symbolic, though costly, nature. In the case of the “Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”, costs play a role as well. The symbolic acts of recognition of the 
city of Jerusalem mandated by these laws were to be accompanied and underscored by future 
expenditures, explicitly mandated and authorized by these laws. 
As a biblical scholar and historian of the religions that consider Jerusalem a holy city, 
I am reminded of two antecedents to these modern pieces of legislation, namely the 
authorization of King Josiah, upon reaching adulthood, to spare no expense on the 
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renovation of the Solomonic temple (see 2 Kings 22:1-7), an act and an attitude that nets this 
late Judahite monarch the highest praise the Bible lavishes on any king;18 and the 
authorization of Caliph Abd al-Malik b. Marwan to build the Dome of the Rock, with no 
expenses spared.19 The idea and the mandate to build Jerusalem is deeply embedded in the 
biblical imagination that seems to play itself out in the modern readers of the ancient Psalms 
and prayers that urge the building Jerusalem.20 Modern Jerusalem-legislation, American and 
Israeli, is driven by biblical mandates and antecedents, whether they are explicitly mentioned 
or not. 
Both laws discussed here constitute political statements in the form of legislative 
acts. Were these acts merely descriptive of the status quo or were they also in some sense 
prescriptive? The Jerusalem Embassy Act was prescriptive in the sense that it mandated the 
US Government to accept, acknowledge, and act on what had long since been the status 
quo. The Administration has resisted this, not just on constitutional grounds that have since 
been debated, but also on policy grounds: US policy in regard to the location of its embassy 
is inconsistent with diplomatic practice anywhere else; in this regard the US Congress was 
right in its findings. But US policy in regard to Jerusalem is consistent with statements made 
by all US Governments since 1967, namely, that the US remains committed to a negotiated 
settlement of the final status of Jerusalem and until that time maintains that the status of 
Jerusalem in international law is that of a corpus separatum, as determined by the 1947 UN 
Partition Resolution. Changing US policy before a negotiated settlement has been reached 
for Jerusalem would be a premature and problematic departure from stated US policy. A 
further political calculation may be that such a move would aggravate US-Arab relations and 
compromise the role of the US as an international broker. 
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And yet, by spelling out a broad popular American consensus on Jerusalem, the 
Jerusalem Embassy Act puts the US on a clear trajectory toward favoring Israel’s view of 
itself as uniquely attached to Jerusalem and uniquely qualified to serve as an arbiter of 
religious freedom in Jerusalem, a role that has since been underscored by various 
congressional measures and public gestures on the part of US lawmakers, who periodically 
commend Israel for maintaining democracy and religious freedom. This is somewhat at odds 
with the emphasis on Judaism’s prerogative with regard to Jerusalem, which introduces a 
contradiction. US law now supports the goal of keeping the city as a whole under Jewish 
sovereignty because of two mutually contradictory reasons: Judaism’s spiritual prerogative 
and Israel’s established practice of providing equal access to and protection of the holy 
places, for all “ethnic religious” communities. It is interesting that the latter, i.e., keeping 
Jerusalem united and the protection of religious rights for all, is also the explicit mandate of 
the Jerusalem Basic Law, while the former—i.e., the Jewish spiritual prerogative—is not an 
explicit part of Israeli law. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Israeli lawmakers fundamentally agree 
with the assertion that the Jews have a longer and deeper connection with Jerusalem than 
anyone else who lays claim to it, and that they felt, as Ben-Gurion expressed it in his 1949 
speech to the Knesset, that Jerusalem was the “innermost heart” of the Jewish State of 
Israel. Here are Ben-Gurion’s words, in translation: 
We see fit to state that Jewish Jerusalem is an organic, inseparable part of the State of Israel, 
just as it is an integral part of Jewish history and belief. ... Jerusalem is the heart of the State of 
Israel. We are proud of the fact that Jerusalem is also sacred to other religions, and will gladly 
provide access to their holy places and enable them to worship as and where they please, 
cooperating with the U.N. to guarantee this. We cannot imagine, however, that the U.N. 
would attempt to sever Jerusalem from the State of Israel or harm Israel's sovereignty in its 
eternal capital.21 
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It is noteworthy that Ben-Gurion, while surely speaking of the idea of Jerusalem as such, was 
satisfied with establishing the capital of Israel in West Jerusalem. 
The fact that we have similar and related, though by no means identical or 
concurrent, laws passed by Israeli and US legislatures is of considerable interest. While this 
parallel indicates something about the “special relationship” between Israel and the US, the 
fact that the US government has not followed up on the Embassy Act indicates that the 
status of Jerusalem is not just contested but remains unstable and in flux as long as its final 
status has not been determined by internationally recognized agreements. This is not in and 
of itself a reason for the US not to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital or to maintain its 
embassy elsewhere. As Ruth Lapidot has pointed out, there is precedent (she specifically 
cites the American representation to East Berlin) for the US to maintain a mission in the 
place of government of a host country, while clarifying its position in a written deposition 
that explains what such a diplomatic presence does or does not entail. Yet the city’s legal 
status remains contested and unresolved and Jerusalem’s status quo as Israel’s undivided 
capital remains in question, which is precisely why these largely symbolic laws were passed in 
the first place. 
NOTES 	
1. Cf., by this author, “Jerusalem in Religious Studies: The City and Scripture,” in 
Jerusalem: Conflict and Cooperation in a Contested City, ed. Miriam Elman and Madeleine Adelman, 
114‒42 (New York, 2014); and “Holy City: Jerusalem in Time, Space, and the Imagination,” 
Transformations: The Journal of Inclusive Scholarship and Pedagogy 29.1 (2008): 40‒67. 
2. Note that Palestinian authorities responded to Israeli legislation with a similar 
document of covenantal status, one even more overtly religious in tone, in order to reaffirm 
a broad Palestinian consensus on the unity and inviolability of Jerusalem. See Menachem 
Klein, The Jerusalem Problem ‒ The Struggle for Permanent Status (Gainesville, FL, 2003), 88‒9. 
11	March	2016	
19 
	
3. 104th Congress Public Law 45, DOCID: f:publ45.104, JERUSALEM EMBASSY 
ACT OF 1995. Public Law 104-45 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
104publ45/html/PLAW-104publ45.htm. 
4. Menachem Klein points out that Camp David II, despite its lack of tangible 
results, broke several important taboos on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, and 
hence called forth strong public counter-reactions, including the 2000 amendment of the 
Basic Law, The Jerusalem Problem, 81‒2. 
5. H Con. Res. 1990 was passed by a vote of 378 yeas to 34 nays. See Allan Kellum, 
“House Voting Record for 1990-91,” in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April/May 
1992, Page 20 (online at URL http://www.wrmea.org/1992-april-may/special-report-house-
voting-record-for-1990-91.html). The 1995 Embassy Act was passed by a vote of 374 yeas to 
37 nays. See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-1995/h734. It was passed under 
“suspension of rules”, a procedure reserved for “non-controversial bills”. 
6. Klein notes that the rightwing reaction to Camp David II had the ironic effect of 
enhancing the public realization that Jerusalem was not, in fact, a united city and that 
therefore the status quo was more seriously threatened than many Israelis had hitherto 
realized, The Jerusalem Problem, 82. 
7. See UN collection of documents on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) at 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/udc.htm. 
8. See Malvina Halberstam, “The Jerusalem Embassy Act,” Fordham International Law 
Journal 19 (1995–96): 1379‒92 (HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) 29 May 29 16:05:56 
2015). 
9. See 101st Congress House Concurrent Resolution 290 (passed 24 April 1990), as 
given at https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/290. 
On some of the differences between H Con Res 290 (1990) and the Embassy Act of 1995; 
see further below. 
10. For background to US foreign policy on Jerusalem see Shlomo Slonim, Jerusalem 
in American Foreign Policy, 1947-1997 (The Hague, 1998). 
11.	101st Congress, 2nd Session, H Con Res 290 (1990). Emphasis added. Cf. 101st 
Congress, S Con. Res. 106 (1990). 
11	March	2016	
20 
	
12. For a detailed commentary on the Jerusalem Basic Law see Ruth Lapidot, The 
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Jerusalem, 1999) [Hebrew]. See the text of the bill 
introduced by MK Cohen on pp. 56‒7. The translation is mine. 
13. The questionable unity of the city in terms of its populations is now a common 
trope in critical debates on the status of Jerusalem. See, e.g., the “Street Talk” video, 
produced by Israel Social TV (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZFY0Hxlt6w), in 
response to Jerusalem Day 2015 and disseminated by +972, a left-wing blog. 
http://972mag.com/watch-street-talk-is-jerusalem-divided-or-united/107547/. On the 
Israeli failure to achieve this and other policy objectives with regard to Jerusalem see Moshe 
Amirav, Jerusalem Syndrome (Eastbourne, UK, 2009). 
14. On the holy places in Israeli law see Marshall J. Breger, “Jerusalem’s Holy Sites in 
Israeli Law,” in Cultural Diversity and Law: Between Cultural Diversity and Common Heritage: Legal 
and Religious Perspectives on the Sacred Places of the Mediterranean, ed. Silvio Ferrari and Andrea 
Benzo, 119‒54 (Farnham, Surrey, 2014) Accessed through ProQuest ebrary. Web. 24 May 
2015. 
15. Moussa Abou Ramadan, “The Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem: An Israeli Law 
Perspective,” in Ferrari and Benzo, Cultural Diversity and Law, 175‒90. 
16. See Klein, The Jerusalem Problem, 83‒8. On the Temple Mount as lieu memoire in 
post-biblical Judaism, see Yaron Eliav, God’s Mountain. The Temple Mount in Time, Place, and 
Memory (Baltimore, 2005); Gershom Gorenberg, The End of Days. Fundamentalism and the 
Struggle for the Temple Mount (Oxford, 2000). 
17. On the Geneva Initiative see http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english. 
18. On the biblical acts of cult centralization see Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher 
Silberman, “Temple and Dynasty: Hezekiah, the Remaking of Judah and the Rise of the Pan-
Israelite Ideology,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 30.3 (2006): 259‒85. On Josiah see 
David Henige, “Found But Not Lost: A Skeptical Note on the Document Discovered in the 
Temple under Josiah,” The Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 7.1 (2007). Online at 
http://www.jhsonline.org/cocoon/JHS/a062.html. 
19. On Abd al-Malik and his seminal role in the Umayyad revolution, see Chase 
Robinson, Abd al-Malik (Oxford, 2005). On the Dome of the Rock, see Oleg Grabar, The 
Shape of the Holy (Princeton, NJ, 1996). 
11	March	2016	
21 
	
20. See, e.g., Psalm 51:18, 147:2. 
21. http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-
resource.php?resourceID=1397. 
